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IAC-D-111/5
(Final - As approved
by IAC and USCIB)
26 February 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Charter for Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC)

1. Attached for information is a copy of the charter for the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) in the form in which it was finally approved at the joint IAC-USCIB meeting on 26 February 1958.

2. We have been advised that the Director of Central Intelligence proposes to issue this charter as a DCID.



Secretary

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MORI/CDF Pages 1-4

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IAC-D-111/5
(Final - As approved
by IAC and USCIB)
26 February 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

C H A R T E R F O R

C R I T I C A L C O L L E C T I O N P R O B L E M S C O M M I T T E E (CCPC)

1. In order to stimulate and improve collection action in certain foreign intelligence fields, a Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) of the IAC is hereby established by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board. The committee will concern itself with the collection of intelligence on certain critical problems specifically referred to it by the Intelligence Advisory Committee or by USCIB through the IAC. Actions or recommendations involving COMINT matters shall be handled through appropriate COMINT mechanisms. In dealing with critical collection problems, the committee is charged with the following responsibilities:

- a. Making an inventory of collection capabilities and actions being taken or planned in order to satisfy highest priority requirements.

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b. Allocating, where practicable by agreement among the member agencies, action that should be taken to improve intelligence collection capabilities or, alternatively, making recommendations through appropriate channels as to additional collection or support actions that should be taken.

c. Fostering the generation of new ideas and techniques for collecting, selecting those that are worthwhile, and assisting their expeditious development and deployment.

d. Studying the results of collection actions in order to recommend action for improvement.

e. Recommending actions to improve speed, relevancy and accuracy of collection and transmission of information.

2. To discharge these responsibilities the CCPC is authorized to have direct access to officials responsible for and cognizant of U. S. operations for the collection of foreign intelligence; and such officials will be responsible for supporting the committee on its request with relevant information, as necessary, on collection capabilities in being, planned or potential -- under appropriate safeguards to protect operations security.

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26 February 1958

3. Committees, such as JAEIC, EIC, SEC, and GMIC, shall continue to recommend national priority intelligence objectives, determine gaps in information, recommend collection requirements, and establish relative priorities on substantive needs within over-all national intelligence objectives. Present collection coordination committees, such as the IPC, ARC, EAC, and IDC, shall support the actions of the committee by coordinating detailed requirements in their respective fields.

4. Representation on the committee may include members from the departments or agencies represented on either the Intelligence Advisory Committee or the United States Communications Intelligence Board. The committee shall be provided with a full-time technical secretary. The chairman shall be provided by the Director of Central Intelligence.

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IAC-D-111/4
24 February 1958
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE


Proposed Charter for a Critical Collection Problems

Committee (CCPC)

1. The attached memorandum encloses a draft charter for a Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC), in the form in which it was modified by USCIBEC. Although copies of this draft charter are being circulated to members of USCIB, these copies are being forwarded through IAC channels also since membership in USCIB and the IAC is not identical and to facilitate review by staff members who deal only with IAC matters.

2. As the memorandum indicates, this matter will be considered by the IAC and USCIB members at a joint meeting scheduled for Wednesday, 26 February.

Distribution:
State - 2
Army - 2
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Air Force - 5
Joint Staff - 2
AEC - 2
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IAC/S - Remainder



JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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USCIB: 9.7/23

24 February 1958

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Proposed Charter for a Critical Collection Problems
Committee (CCPC)

Reference: USCIB 9.7/22 dated 14 February 1958

1. As directed by USCIB at its 148th Meeting, USCIBEC has considered the proposed charter for a Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC), enclosure with the reference, and has prepared the enclosed modified charter for USCIB consideration.

2. This matter will be considered at a joint USCIB-IAC meeting to be held at 1045, Wednesday, 26 February 1958, in Room 115, Administration Building, CIA.



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Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s

cc: Secretary, IAC

USCIB: 9.7/23

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S E C R E T

DRAFT
24 February 1958

CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS COMMITTEE (CCPC)

1. In order to stimulate and improve collection action in certain foreign intelligence fields, a Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) of the IAC is hereby established by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board. The committee will concern itself with the collection of intelligence on certain critical problems specifically referred to it by the Intelligence Advisory Committee or USCIB. Actions or recommendations involving COMINT matters shall be handled through appropriate COMINT mechanisms. Pursuant thereto, the committee is charged with the following responsibilities:

a. Surveying collection capabilities and actions being taken or planned in order to satisfy highest priority requirements.

b. Allocating, where practicable by agreement among the member agencies, action that should be taken to improve intelligence collection capabilities or, alternatively, making recommendations through appropriate channels as to additional collection or support actions that should be taken.

c. Fostering the generation of new ideas and techniques for collecting, selecting those that are worthwhile, and assisting their expeditious development and deployment.

d. Studying the results of collection actions in order to recommend action for improvement.

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S E C R E T

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e. Recommending actions to improve speed, relevancy and accuracy of collection and transmission of information.

2. To discharge these responsibilities the CCPC is authorized to have direct access to officials responsible for and cognizant of U.S. collection operations; and such officials will be responsible for supporting the committee on its request with relevant information, as necessary, on collection capabilities in being, planned or potential -- under appropriate safeguards to protect operations security.

3. Committees, such as JAEIC, EIC, SEC, and GMIC, shall continue to recommend national priority intelligence objectives, determine gaps in information, recommend collection requirements, and establish relative priorities on substantive needs within over-all national intelligence objectives. Present collection coordination committees, such as the IPC, ARC, EAC, and IDC, shall support the actions of the committee by coordinating detailed requirements in their respective fields.

4. Representation on the committee shall include members from the departments or agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee or the United States Communications Intelligence Board. The committee shall be provided with a full-time technical secretary. The chairman shall be provided by the Director of Central Intelligence.

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IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of IAC Ad Hoc Working Group

Reference: IAC-M-322, 27 December 1957, item 7

1. The attached memorandum, reporting the results of a study undertaken by an ad hoc working group under the chairmanship of Dr. Scoville pursuant to IAC action on 27 December, is forwarded for review. The Chairman sets forth his views in Tab A while the views of the other members are stated in Tab B.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 11 February, for discussion and appropriate action.



J JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Report of IAC Ad Hoc Working Group
REFERENCE : IAC-M-322 dated 27 December 1957

1. The Ad Hoc Working Group was unable to arrive at an agreed position.

2. The Chairman's views are stated in Tab A. He believes that the assignment to his Working Group (see reference) limits the group's consideration to problems related to the collection of guided missiles intelligence. Therefore, Tab A is limited to this field of activity.

3. The views of the other members of the Ad Hoc Working Group are set forth in Tab B. These members agree that the function of any collection coordination group should not be limited to guided missiles, but should include all highest priority problems.

4. All members emphasize the need for further discussion of the size and scope of activity of the recommended permanent staff to a collection coordination group.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Chairman
IAC Ad Hoc Working Group

Enclosures: Tab A
Tab B

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TAB A
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
Draft

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Recommended Charter for an IAC Subcommittee on Guided Missile Collection Activities

1. In accordance with IAC action of 27 December 1957 on the Post-Mortem on SNIE 11-10-57, the views and recommendations of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Killian Recommendation No. 4 are submitted herewith.

a. A permanent subcommittee of the IAC should be charged with surveying critical collection problems related to intelligence on guided missiles. The primary purpose of the group should be to insure that U.S. operational capabilities collect the maximum possible information on top priority needs.

b. A subcommittee should have access as necessary to relevant information on guided missile collection capabilities and operations, in being and planned.

c. The subcommittee should be composed of officials who are sufficiently senior in their own organizations to be able to represent their agencies in matters of action in as many cases as possible.

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TAB A
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
Draft

d. The subcommittee should function on the principle that it can settle most of its problems by operating under the "allocation of action by agreement" principle and that it should seek to minimize the necessity for referral to the IAC for specific approval.

e. The subcommittee should be primarily concerned with maintaining proper focus and balance of action throughout the spectrum of critical needs and must resist any tendency to become bogged down in day-to-day operational matters, which are the functions of other bodies. It must strike a reasonable balance between time spent on present critical gaps and time spent on considering means for moving ahead with new systems and techniques.

f. The work of the subcommittee must be facilitated by the efforts of a small staff composed of officers who would be detailed by each collecting agency and would be knowledgeable of present collection capabilities and possible advanced collection techniques.

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Other two committees not in HB Chapter c

TAB A
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
Draft

2. Committees, such as JAEIC, EIC, SEC, and GMIC, should continue to recommend national priority intelligence objectives, determine gaps in information, recommend collection requirements, and establish relative priorities on substantive needs within over-all national intelligence objectives. Present collection coordination committees such as the IPC, ARC, EAC, and IDC should support the actions of the subcommittee by coordinating detailed requirements in their respective fields.

3. It is believed that a guided missile collection subcommittee can most profitably spend its time on reviewing the adequacy of existing and potential collection activities, assets and techniques in terms of what these can contribute and what should be emphasized. In this connection, there is an urgent and continuing need to encourage the generation of new ideas and techniques for collection, to select those that are worthwhile, and to see that implementation proceeds as rapidly as circumstances demand and that the IAC is kept advised. From time to time, it may be desirable for the subcommittee to determine whether collectors interpret correctly the requirements levied on them, and whether all the necessary background information

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TAB A
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
Draft

is supplied to them. Additionally, some time may well be spent on procedures for the processing of collected information in order to make recommendations to the IAC leading to an improvement in the timeliness and relevancy of reporting.

4. In addition to IAC agencies, the NSA should be invited to participate in the work of the Subcommittee on Guided Missile Collection Activities (SGMCA).

5. With these features of the problem in mind, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group submits for your consideration a proposed charter for a Guided Missile Collection Activities Subcommittee (See Appendix 1).

Attachment: Appendix 1

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Appendix 1 to
TAB A
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
Draft

DRAFT CHARTER FOR
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GUIDED MISSILE COLLECTION
ACTIVITIES (SGMCA)

1. In order to stimulate and improve collection actions on certain critical intelligence gaps, the Subcommittee on Guided Missile Collection Activities is charged by the Intelligence Advisory Committee with the following responsibilities:

a. Maintaining a continuous survey of guided missile collection capabilities and of actions being taken or planned in order to satisfy the highest priority requirements for intelligence in the field of guided missiles.

b. In all cases which do not involve major policy, budgetary, or operational considerations, collection action where agreed should be taken to improve intelligence on critical gaps without awaiting prior approval of the IAC.

c. Making recommendations to the IAC on additional collection actions that should be taken.

d. Fostering the generation of new ideas and techniques for collecting, selecting those that are worthwhile, and assisting their expeditious development and deployment.

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Appendix 1 to
TAB A
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
Draft

e. Reviewing the results of collection actions taken in order to make necessary recommendations for improvement.

f. Examining procedures for the processing of collection information in order to make recommendations to the IAC leading to an improvement in the timeliness and relevancy of reporting.

2. To discharge these responsibilities the SGMCA is authorized:

a. To have access as necessary to relevant information on guided missile collection capabilities and actions being taken or planned by the collecting agencies.

b. To establish a small staff to ensure proper support of the SGMCA.

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TAB B
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
Draft

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Recommended Charter for an IAC Subcommittee on Collection Activities (SCA)

1. In accordance with IAC action of 27 December 1957 on the Post-Mortem on SNIE 11-10-57, the views and recommendations of the IAC Ad Hoc Working Group on Killian Recommendation No. 4 (with the exception of the Chairman) are submitted herewith.

a. A permanent subcommittee of the IAC should be charged with surveying critical collection problems, of which those related to guided missiles and long-range aircraft would be examples of current importance. The primary purpose of the subcommittee should be to insure that U. S. operational capabilities collect the maximum possible information on top priority needs.

b. The subcommittee should have complete access to all information on collection capabilities and operations, in being and planned.

c. The subcommittee should be composed of officials who are sufficiently senior in their own organizations to be able to commit their agencies as to action in as many cases as possible.

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TAB B
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
Draft

d. The subcommittee should function on the principle that it can settle most of its problems by operating under the "allocation of action by agreement" principle and that it should seek to minimize the necessity for referral to the IAC for specific approval.

e. The subcommittee should be primarily concerned with maintaining proper focus and balance of action throughout the spectrum of critical needs and must resist any tendency to become bogged down in day-to-day operational matters. It must strike a reasonable balance between time spent on critical gaps of the past and present and time spent on considering means for moving ahead with new systems and techniques.

f. The work of the subcommittee must be facilitated by the efforts of a small permanent staff composed of officers who would be detailed by each collecting agency and would be knowledgeable of present collection capabilities and possible advanced techniques.

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TAB B
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
Draft

2. Production committees, such as JAEIC, EIC, SEC, and GMIC, should continue to recommend national priority intelligence objectives, determine gaps, recommend collection requirements, and establish relative priorities on substantive needs. Present collection coordination committees such as the IPC, ARC, EAC, and IDC should support the actions of the subcommittee.

3. It is believed that a collection coordination committee can most profitably spend its time on reviewing the adequacy of collection activities, assets and techniques in terms of what these can contribute and what should be emphasized. In this connection, there is an urgent and continuing need to encourage the generation of new ideas and techniques for collection, to select those that are worthwhile, and to see that implementation proceeds as rapidly as circumstances demand. From time to time, it may be desirable for the subcommittee to determine whether collectors interpret correctly the requirements levied on them, and whether all the necessary background information is supplied to them. Additionally, some time may well be spent on procedures for the processing of collected information in order to improve the timeliness and relevancy of reporting.

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TAB B
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
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4. In addition to IAC agencies, the NSA should be invited to participate in the work of the Subcommittee on Collection Activities (SCA).

5. With these features of the problem in mind, the Ad Hoc Working Group (with the exception of the Chairman) submits for your consideration a proposed charter for a collection coordination subcommittee (See Appendix 1).

Attachment: Appendix 1

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Appendix 1 to
TAB B
4 February 1958
Draft

DRAFT CHARTER FOR
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COLLECTION ACTIVITIES (SCA)

1. In order to stimulate and improve collection actions on certain critical intelligence gaps, the Subcommittee on Collection Activities is charged by the Intelligence Advisory Committee with the following responsibilities:

- a. Maintaining a continuous survey of collection capabilities and of actions being taken or planned in order to satisfy highest priority requirements.
- b. Allocation, by agreement among the membership, of collection action that should be taken to improve intelligence on critical gaps.
- c. Making recommendations to the IAC on additional collection actions that should be taken.
- d. Fostering the generation of new ideas and techniques for collecting, selecting those that are worthwhile, and assisting their expeditious development and deployment.
- e. Reviewing the results of collection actions taken.
- f. Examining procedures for the processing of collected information in order to improve the timeliness and relevancy of reporting.

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Appendix 1 to
TAB B
IAC-D-111/3
4 February 1958
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2. To discharge these responsibilities the SCA is authorized:

a. To have full access to information on collection capabilities and actions being taken or planned by the collecting agencies.

b. To establish a small permanent staff to ensure proper support of the SCA.

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TS #111654/B
IAC-D-111/2
6 December 1957
(Limited Distribution)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Recommendation No. 4, Report of the President's Board
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities,
dated 24 October 1957

REFERENCE: IAC-M-318, item 6

Attached for your information is a copy of the reply with
respect to Recommendation No. 4 of the President's Board of
Consultants, in the form in which it was forwarded by the
Director of Central Intelligence to the Executive Secretary, NSC.


JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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TS #141654/B
IAC-D-111/2
6 December 1957
(Limited Distribution)

30 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT : Recommendation No. 4, Report of the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities, dated 24 October 1957

1. Recommendation No. 4 in the reference report reads:

"That, in the light of recent Soviet accomplishments (1) primary intelligence effort be directed towards the acquisition and interpretation of information on the Soviet missile program, particularly, in terms of the capabilities of propulsion--delivery systems (land and sea) and the sizes of nuclear warheads and (2) that our intelligence on the Soviet Strategic Air Arm be re-evaluated and an all-out effort be made to supplement our present knowledge with necessary additional hard facts."

2. I have consulted with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee relative to the subject recommendation and am hereby furnishing our agreed views and comments.

a. The IAC concurs with the recommendation that a primary intelligence effort be directed toward the Soviet long-range air capability and missile effort, and at the same time wishes to call attention to the fact that these subjects have for several years been in the highest priority category of National Intelligence Objectives and have been the subject of a major collection and evaluation effort. These efforts have produced significant factual information. We recognize that gaps still exist in the collection of "hard facts" required in order to make complete estimates of the Soviet capabilities.

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IAC-D-111/2
6 December 1957
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b. In the light of recent Soviet accomplishments, the efforts of the intelligence community have been re-examined and new collection programs have been instituted and directed at closing the gaps.

c. The intelligence community has developed collection techniques which could prove extremely valuable in improving our "hard facts" in the fields of long-range aviation and missiles. To date, the information obtained from some of these methods has been limited due to restrictions on permitted operations. Were these restrictions to be lifted, major intelligence gains could be expected.

3. With reference to the phrasing of the recommendation, the IAC considers the production and deployment, and the intentions, doctrines and plans for operational employment of Soviet medium and long-range missiles to be of equal importance as intelligence targets to the characteristics of these missiles. Further, in the re-evaluation of intelligence on the Soviet Strategic Air Arm, we feel that information on the number, types and performance characteristics of their formations is of importance.

/s/

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

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
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IAC-D-111/1
21 November 1957
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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Recommendation No. 4 - Report of the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated October 24, 1957

Attached is a report by the IAC ad hoc subcommittee on
Recommendation No. 4 of the President's Board of Consultants,
prepared pursuant to the direction of the IAC on 19 November.
This report, including the subcommittee's agreed draft reply,
will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for
26 November for review and appropriate action.



JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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TS #141654/a
IAC-D-111/1
21 November 1957
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MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Report of IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on
Killian Recommendation No. 4

1. As directed at the IAC meeting of 19 November 1957, an Ad Hoc Subcommittee was convened on 21 November 1957 to draft comments on Recommendation No. 4 for the consideration of the IAC. Copies of the Subcommittee's agreed draft reply are attached.

2. The following designated representatives of the IAC agencies met:

<u>GMIC</u>	Colonel Earle McFarland
<u>Army</u>	Mr. Ray Adcock Mr. Lanier Castilio Lt. Colonel Gram Evans
<u>Navy</u>	Captain B. S. Weber
<u>Air Force</u>	Maj. General James H. Walsh Colonel R. R. Stewart
<u>Joint Staff</u>	Colonel R. H. Stumpf
<u>AEC</u>	Mr. Milton Jenkins
<u>State</u>	Mr. Howard Wiedemann
<u>FBI</u>	Mr. Meffert Kuhrtz
<u>CIA</u>	Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr. (Chairman) <div data-bbox="711 1629 1057 1671" style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 213px;"></div>

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3. The Ad Hoc Subcommittee in its deliberations considered the verbatim text of Recommendation No. 4 rather than the abbreviated version of this recommendation in the forwarding letter from

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TS #141654/a
IAC-D-111/1
21 November 1957
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the Executive Secretary, National Security Council. It should be noted that the two versions are not identical. The abbreviated version refers to "re-evaluation" of intelligence on Soviet Strategic Air Arm, but this thought is not present in the Killian Board recommendation.

/s/
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Chairman
IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee

Enclosure

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TS #141654/a
IAC-D-111/1
21 November 1957
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT : Recommendation No. 4 - Report of the
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities dated October 24, 1957

In accordance with your request of 28 October, I have consulted with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) relative to the subject recommendation and am hereby furnishing our agreed views and comments.

1. The IAC concurs wholeheartedly with the recommendation that primary intelligence effort be directed toward the Soviet long-range air capability and missile effort.

2. For several years these items have been in the highest priority category of national intelligence objectives and the community has directed a major effort toward collecting and evaluating intelligence related to these fields. Despite these efforts, which have produced significant new factual information, we agree that major gaps still exist in the "hard facts" required in order to make firm estimates of the Soviet capabilities.

3. In light of recent Soviet accomplishments, the intelligence community efforts in this field have been

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IAC-D-111/1
21 November 1957
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redoubled and several new collection programs instituted.

The intelligence community has developed collection techniques which could prove extremely valuable in improving our "hard facts" in these fields. To date the information obtained from some of these methods has been limited due to restrictions on permitted operations. Were these restrictions to be lifted, major intelligence gains could be expected. Further exploitation of present collection techniques and resources and development of new ones must be undertaken by the intelligence community to assist in closing the gaps.

4. The production and deployment of Soviet long-range missiles are considered to be of equal importance to the characteristics of these missiles which are given primary attention in Recommendation No. 4.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Chairman

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TS #141654
IAC-D-111
4 November 1957
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Recommendation No. 4 - Report of the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated October 24, 1957

The attached memorandum will be placed on the agenda of the
IAC meeting now scheduled for 12 November, for noting and preliminary
discussion.



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Secretary

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AD/NE - 1

DD/C - 1

IAC/S - Remainder

GMIC - 1 - 12 Nov

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TS #141654
IAC-D-111
4 November 1957

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
National Security Council
Washington

October 28, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Recommendation No. 4 - Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated October 24, 1957

The semiannual status report of the President's Board of Consultants, above referred to, as presented to the President on October 24, 1957, contained the following recommendation:

Recommendation No. 4:

"That, in the light of recent Soviet accomplishments (1) primary intelligence effort be directed towards the acquisition and interpretation of information on the Soviet missile program, particularly, in terms of the capabilities of propulsion-- delivery systems (land and sea) and the sizes of nuclear warheads and (2) that our intelligence on the Soviet Strategic Air Arm be re-evaluated and an all-out effort be made to supplement our present knowledge with necessary additional hard facts."

Attached hereto is a quotation from the abovementioned report in which the Board discusses this recommendation.

Before the President takes action on this recommendation, he requests that you consult with the IAC agencies and furnish to him your views and comments on this recommendation.

It would be appreciated if your report could be provided to this office not later than November 30, 1957.

Enclosure

cc: The Secretary of Defense
cc: Members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee



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TS #141654
IAC-D-111
4 November 1957

Attachment:

Recommendation No. 4

"The intelligence produced to date on both the Soviet missile effort and the Soviet Strategic Air Command is essentially deductive. The somewhat uncertain evidence on which our estimates of Soviet long-range air capabilities is based, and our lack of success in procuring adequate substantive supporting facts leaves some doubt as to their complete reliability.

"While we have accumulated a considerable amount of evidence on Soviet missile testing our lack of hard facts on their missile developments would appear to be handicapping severely the shaping of our own parallel programs and counter measures.

"Consequently the primary collection-evaluation task of the Intelligence Community at this time, in our view, is the acquisition and interpretation of more concrete information on (1) the Soviet long-range air capability in terms of the number, types and performance characteristics of their formations, and (2) the Soviet missile effort with particular reference to the types and potential of propulsion-delivery systems and the sizes of nuclear warheads already developed, tested and contemplated in their program.

"We urge that present collection plans be reviewed and, to the extent necessary, recast to assure that every collection possibility is explored and the total means of the Intelligence Community applied in an effort to obtain the vital missing information at the earliest date."

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